Study of War Conferences
ANTHROPOLOGY AND WAR (28 January 1994)
BIOLOGY AND WAR (22 April 1994)
ECONOMICS AND WAR (Sept 15 1994)
SOCIOLOGY AND WAR (Nov 18 1994)
LAW AND WAR (Jan 20 1995)
PSYCHOLOGY AND WAR (Apr 21 1995)
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND WAR (Sept 15 1995)
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND WAR (Sept 16 1995)
HISTORY AND WAR (March 22 1996)
THE HUMANITIES AND WAR (Nov 22 1996)
"Anthropology And War" Conference
Sheraton University Center, Durham, N.C.
28 January 1994
About the Speakers. The five anthropologists who made presentations at the conference exhibited a wide range of research interests. Robert L. Carneiro, Curator at the American Museum of Natural History, has done extensive field work among Indian groups in South America. Currently an adjunct professor at Columbia University, he received his doctorate at the University of Michigan. Carol R. Ember has been a professor of anthropology at Hunter College, City University of New York since 1970. She has published widely in the field, often collaborating with her husband (see immediately following). She earned her doctorate at Harvard University. Melvin Ember, formerly chairman of the anthropology department at Hunter College, has held the post of president of the Human Relations Area Files since 1987. He has lectured and published widely on the subject of the conference. He received his doctorate from Yale University. Jonathan Haas, vice president of the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago, has spent some twenty-five years in archeological field work, mainly in the southwestern United States. He earned two masters degrees and a doctorate from Columbia University. Rutgers University's R. Brian Ferguson also earned his doctorate at Columbia. Much of his field work has been done in Puerto Rico. He has published and spoken widely in the field -- as indeed have all of the Conference presenters.
Conference Proceedings. With some ninety persons in attendance, Jonathan Haas began the conference with a talk entitled, "The Origins of War and Ethnic Violence." Haas first questioned the assumptions that war is an inherent part of the human condition and that ethnic groups naturally see each other with fear and hatred. Observing that humans existed for hundreds of thousands of years before the advent of written histories, Haas turned to archaeological evidence from the North American continent to isolate the factors that he believes originated war and ethnic violence. The archaeological record shows no evidence of warfare or organized violence in the first 10,000 years that people inhabited the North American continent. Haas used a case study of the Anasazi peoples of the American Southwest to argue that the beginnings of settled agriculture and gradual ethnic differentiation were preconditions for the development of conflict. Yet, he argued, these differences alone were not enough to lead to war. It took a combination of unfavorable factors including climatic change, population pressure, and environmental stress to produce a competition for resources that, by the thirteenth century A.D., produced warfare. Haas concluded that violence was the last resort of people faced with imminent extinction.
When members of the panel began their comments, Brian Ferguson
expressed curiosity as to how evidence of Anasazi cannibalism
fit into Haas' conceptualization of the origins of war. Haas replied
that cannibalism appeared in his area of investigation before
the advent of warfare and suggested that its extremely violent
nature could indicate a ritual, rather than a subsistence function.
Haas added, in response to comments from the panel, that the victims
most likely were prisoners; he suggested that ritual violence
may be part of the process by which warfare transforms "the
other" into non-human, a process he views as connected with
tribalism and linguistic differentiation. Professor Ferguson noted
that this kind of cultural difference does not necessarily bring
on war, and Haas agreed, observing that the reasons for beginning
a war were often quite different from those for continuing a conflict;
once war appeared in the archaeological record, however, it never
went away. At the same time, he maintained, the incidence of conflict
did decline as environmental stresses lessened.
After the floor was opened to discussion by conference participants,
Haas responded to questions about variables he might have found
to account for internal conflict or terrorism. He observed that
many motives for violence exist that are difficult or impossible
to infer from archaeological evidence. A conference participant
asked Haas for his views on conflict between pastoral and agrarian
cultures as an origin of war, especially when only one group had
the use of horses. Haas responded that we cannot automatically
assume cultures to be in conflict in the absence of other factors,
but noted the advantage gained by the people of the North American
plains when they began to use horses after contact with Spaniards.
Haas then replied to several questions on the significance of
cannibalism, pointing out that scholars are re-evaluating archaeological
evidence, but that it remains difficult to discern possible uses
of cannibalism. He cited as possible evidence of cannibalism used
as a political tool the destruction of a whole village, an act
that seemed to have been outside the material standard for the
area. In response to a query about specific linguistic examples
of cultures that have words for themselves as "people,"
and others as "not people," the panel generally agreed
that cross-cultural studies are needed to determine the true incidence
of these linguistic patterns and their significance for conceptualization
of "the other."
R. Brian Ferguson began his lecture on "Local and Global
Factors in Generating War" by suggesting that anthropologists
can build explanations for war in places such as Africa and Eastern
Europe by examining war as a specific form of social and cultural
organization and by using cross-cultural analysis to show the
significance of a wide variety of factors. Local conflict, in
Ferguson's opinion, is inextricably linked to national and global
processes. In order to understand the process of war, supra-local
influences must be recognized as crucial. The most important of
these, he maintained, are the pressures brought to bear by expanding
states, with European expansion being the best known example.
Even seemingly unaffected societies can be subtly changed by expanding
states, especially in terms of increased war and indigenous violence.
Ferguson then turned to a case study of the Yanamami peoples of
the Brazilian rain forest, whom, scholars have maintained, are
some of the most isolated but "most warlike" peoples
on earth. Questioning whether the Yanamami are normally warlike,
he asserted that internal violence may simply be a reaction to
external state pressure. A market in western goods, in particular,
has transformed social relations among the Yanamami. Material
goods become the primary basis of social action, he argued, even
when the Yanamami cite personal or moral justifications for conflict.
Ferguson then applied this theory to Africa, noting that the United
Nations is now having to deal with armed groups not associated
with states. Because state building in Africa was artificial,
superpowers propped up authoritarian governments and the World
Bank managed their economies. For those reasons, he concluded
that social relations within African states are inextricably connected
to external powers. Thus, Ferguson hypothesized, there may be
no such thing as a purely local war. Because ethnicity becomes
linked to current economic or political relations, the international
system may be unconsciously creating conditions that tear it apart.
The panel
discussion began with a question from Carol Ember about possible
biases in anthropological sources, as many early observers of
non-industrial societies were military or commercial personnel.
Ferguson replied that many first contact reports do not seem to
be reliable; anthropologists can construct village histories and
correlate them with changes in the contact situation. Panelist
Robert Carneiro, acknowledging his long-standing differences of
opinion with Ferguson, stated that he saw war in South America
as an integral part of state-building, not as a result of contact.
Ferguson stressed in his response that he was not suggesting that
indigenous peoples were "noble savages" before contact,
but rather that he was advocating the inclusion of external factors
in models constructed to explain war. When asked about anthropologist
Chagnon's biological explanation of Yanamami warfare, which holds
that warriors have the most reproductive success, Ferguson questioned
Chagnon's classification of warriors, in that it includes tribal
leaders. In his view, truly warlike individuals died in battle
before they could have many children; thus, they had a very low
success rate in passing on their genes.
As the discussion period opened, a member of the audience put
forth the counter-example of the Roman Empire, which achieved
peace by wiping out the enemies of its Gallic allies. Ferguson
remarked that this example reflects fundamental differences between
older world systems and the modern one. Panelist Melvin Ember
added that his cross-cultural research found only forty percent
of cases in which initial contact resulted in pacification. Of
the remaining sixty percent, eighty-nine percent of those cultures
engaged in war at least every ten years. Jonathan Haas then suggested
that the incidence of pacification may be related to the impact
of superpower interests in a given situation. Several questions
followed on ritual warfare, including competitions, games, sports,
and tests of champions. Professor Ferguson noted that military
sports correlate with the presence of war and that early contact
reports often commented on war as ritual; competition between
champions, however, does not seem to have been employed. Ritual,
he argued, is the institutionalization of self-interest in a conflict
situation. Returning to the question of sources, Ferguson responded
to the suggestion that confusion over time might be common in
periods of conflict by noting that ethno-historians could avoid
misunderstanding by constructing a core of genealogy and village
movements, for which times can be established by determining who
was born in which location. A conference participant then asked
how cultural models for warfare became dominant in view of the
supposition that, genetically speaking, warfare is unprofitable
and risky. In the discussion that followed, conference participants
stressed the lack of genetic evidence for aggression and questioned
the use of methodologies that correlate evidence with explanation
on the basis of human rationality and assumptions of functionality.
Panel members pointed out that theories of material rationality
for warfare are still under active dispute in the anthropological
field; they expressed a consensus that the evidence falls on the
side of cultural explanations for war.
Melvin R. Ember led off the afternoon session with a talk on "Causes
and Consequences of War: A Cross-Cultural Study." Using statistical
cross-cultural analysis to test hypotheses, Ember and his colleagues
determined that a statistically significant result for a particular
time should be obtained if the variables correlate. The advantages
of this type of study, he argued, are that conclusions drawn from
such world-wide comparisons come closest to expressing a universal
phenomenon. He differentiated his study from cross-national comparisons,
noting that his data compare societies as defined primarily by
linguistic differentiation. His major findings point to an ecological
explanation for war, which he defined as armed combat between
units, usually not involving specific forces or politically unified
societies. His multiple regression analyses found that, where
unpredictable natural disasters destroyed food supplies, societies
faced with the threat of scarcity chronically engaged in conflict.
The actual incidence of scarcity was not important and victors
took resources even when they did not have an immediate resource
problem. Further, socialization for aggression did not seem to
be a predictor of war, but socialization for mistrust was highly
predictive. Thus, fear predicts war, whether fear of others or
of nature. Professor Ember hypothesized that unpredictable disaster
may make people less trustful and noted that his findings could
be applied to complex industrial societies if disaster is defined
in terms of complex economic interdependencies.
Discussion centered at first on issues of fear and security, one
conference participant hypothesizing that fear could explain the
tendency of nation-states to fight for security. Panelist Carol
Ember noted that national security is a constant concern, but
its importance varies in proportion to the magnitude of insecurities
at a given time. A conference attendee underscored the correlation
between economic downturn and war and held that economic difficulties
can be seen as a kind of "natural disaster." One of
the panelists then commented that socialization for mistrust seems
more a consequence of warfare than a cause. Professor Carol Ember
proposed an environmental explanation for this type of socialization,
noting specifically that temperate regions, with their unpredictable
weather patterns, saw a higher incidence of socialization for
mistrust. When questioned about the correlation between military
technology and a willingness to initiate conflict, she cited a
cross-national study which indicates that military parity makes
war more likely than a vast inequality of armed strength. When
asked to what extent their correlation assumed rational decision
making, she noted that people's stated motivations and their actions
were often quite different; for example, protagonists may claim
to be fighting for revenge, but end up taking land.
Carol Ember then turned to her presentation on "Democracy
and Peace: A Cross-Cultural Study." She began by explaining
that her study was designed as a test of results from cross-national
analyses that found a lower incidence of warfare between democracies
-- states which, however, were found to engage in conflict with
non-democracies at a usual frequency. Scholars have questioned
the assumption that people within a democracy respect the individual
rights of others if those people are self-governing and are less
restrained when considering non-democracies; a cross-cultural
study would test whether this vision of "the other"
indeed justifies hostile policies on the part of democracies.
Because the cultures in their sample were not unified beyond the
community level, Ember and her colleagues had to construct an
analog of democracy based on various factors. These included levels
of participation and decision making, concentration of political
power, including rates of adult participation, levels of local
decision-making, and the frequency of community fission. Thus,
their revised hypothesis was that political units with wider participation
and more willingness to agree to disagree go to war with each
other less often than with other polities. Excluding cases where
coders disagreed, excluding pacified societies, and controlling
for community size and physical conditions, the cross-cultural
results were consistent with the cross-national data. Low levels
of political participation predict internal war, with multiple
regression analysis showing that the local level is more important
than the actions of higher political authorities.
The majority of questions from the floor concerned methodology,
including how Dr. Ember and her co-researchers defined democracy
and what they considered indicators of procedural democracy. A
conference participant cited the example of the American Civil
War as a case in which there were limits to dissension that a
system could stand, but in which fission did not take place. Ember
observed that disagreement seems to produce war or gridlock. India
and Ireland were suggested as anomalous situations where lack
of commonality produced internal conflict.
Discussion then turned to distinctions between internal and external
war and the researchers' definition of society based on language.
A panelist expressed the view that the two studies presented in
this session fit together, and a member of the audience wondered
if it was possible to correlate fear with the perception of another
country as a democracy. When asked whether there was a correlation
between female participation and war, the Embers replied that
societies with higher overall frequencies of war were more likely
to exclude women from political participation.
Robert L. Carneiro rounded out the afternoon with his talk, "From
Autonomous Village to the State: the Role of Warfare." He
began by drawing a distinction between dispersive warfare and
aggregative warfare, which he saw as connected with the beginnings
of settled agriculture, especially in borderlands with a less-hospitable
environment. Aggregative warfare, he argued, produced simple and
compound "chiefdoms," the latter of which began to resemble
small states. Thus, in his view, aggregative warfare is the process
that underlies all political evolution. As evidence for this statement,
Carneiro turned to a case study of state development in Spain
between 2500 B.C. and 1479 A.D. Tracing Iberian evolution from
the Neolithic peoples, to the three tribes noted by the Roman
invaders, through Greek colonization and pre-Moorish barbarian
invasions, Carneiro linked war to political unification. After
the seventh century A.D., the interplay between the Moors and
Spain's Christian defenders resulted in the final unification
of Spain under Christian kings. He emphasized the non-rectilinear
development of a unified kingdom, and linked the phenomenon to
the unwillingness of autonomous political units to surrender their
sovereignty without a fight. In conclusion, Carneiro surmised,
in light of the development of the European Community and other
international phenomena, that there may be new state-building
mechanisms at work which have taken over the aggregative function
of warfare.
The discussion period opened with the presentation of several
examples of amalgamation without warfare and the observation that
some polities put together in conflict now appear to be breaking
apart in conflict. A conference participant pointed out that it
is easy, from a historical perspective, to find examples for several
different points of view on the importance of war in state formation
and noted that the pace of change during a given time period may
be a factor that Professor Carneiro's thesis does not take into
account. The exchange of views then turned to the question of
aggregation in response to an outside threat in contrast with
aggregation after submission to an external authority. A conference
participant noted that some groups do not submit to authority
and that various degrees of autonomy can exist within a formally
unified area. Another conference participant pointed out that
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union were often paired as examples
of state-formation through violence, but the actual circumstances
of their formation and disintegration were quite distinct. Finally,
several panel members observed that recent examples of consolidation
without conflict may suggest new aggregative mechanisms operating
within the international system.
In conclusion, members of the audience asked the panelists to
summarize their views on how cultural anthropology, including
the analysis of symbolism, rhetoric, and ritual, can influence
studies of war, peace, and the military. The panel generally agreed
that cultural anthropology offers a valuable perspective in that
it tries to explain the meaning of war instead of focusing solely
on its practice. Noting that symbolic systems, particularly languages,
correlate to perceptions of how war occurs, the panelists agreed
that more cross-cultural studies were needed to clarify the role
of symbolic systems in war. One panelist noted the tendency of
anthropologists to rely on their own interpretations instead of
asking people inside a culture for theirs. This comment elicited
several different opinions from conference participants on the
relative significance of the ethnographer's bias, the role of
self-reflection, and the importance of bringing several viewpoints
to bear in a given study. As a final comment, the panelists concurred
that anthropology, more readily than other disciplines, can offer
a useful cross-cultural perspective in the study of war.
The Biological Sciences and War"
Carolina Inn, Chapel Hill, N.C.
22 April 1994
About the Speakers. Ronald J. Barfield, who earned his Ph.D. at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), is with the Department of Biological Sciences at Rutgers University. He has authored or co-authored numerous publications on sexual and aggressive behavior. Professor-emeritus George W. Barlow, whose doctorate is from UCLA, retired recently from the Department of Zoology and Integrative Biology at the University of California, Berkeley. He has written numerous articles and two books, including Sociology, Beyond Nature/Nurture? (1980). Benson E. Ginsburg is a professor of psychiatry at the University of Connecticut and chairs the Behavioral Genetics Laboratory. The author of many publications, including a forthcoming study of aggressive behavior in mice, he earned his doctorate at the University of Chicago. Duke University's Peter H. Klopfer has been with the Department of Zoology since 1958. Among his many studies is a recent work, with J. Polemics, on aggression in children. He earned his Ph.D. at Yale University.
Conference
Proceedings. George W. Barlow led off the conference, attended
by fifty scholars, with a presentation entitled AWar as an Adaptation
Gone Wrong. " He introduced his comments by observing that
one of the most important characteristics of human society is
cooperation for both constructive purposes (such as saving lives
in a hospital) and for destructive purposes (such as war). Barlow
noted that while he would approach his talk from an evolutionary
biologist's perspective, he cautioned conference attendees that
he was not attempting to draw strict homologies between animal
and human behavior. As a basis for his observations of human behavior,
he referred to cooperation among animals in their struggles to
reproduce and raise their young, which ranges from relatively
simple one-parent cases (where all parental duties are taken care
of by one parent) to more complex situations (where the biological
parents are assisted in raising the young by Ahelpers such as
the older siblings of the latest arrivals). In all examples of
animal cooperation, the perception of kinship provides the Aglue
that holds relationships together. Barlow contended that all relationships
are based on a cost/benefit calculus. This framework implies that
as genetic relationships become more distant, greater benefits
must accrue for an individual to help another individual.
In Barlow's view, conflict can be explained in evolutionary biological
terms by the Aeconomics of aggression in that the benefits must
outweigh the costs for a conflict to occur. The benefits of these
battles always center around competition for limited resources
such as food and water and for reproductive rights. Barlow observed
that coalitions of animals sometimes act in tandem to achieve
access to important resources, such as small groups of roving
male lions violently taking over another group of lions, killing
the other males and cubs. This situation raised a central question:
Are these instances of aggression between animals equivalent to
wars between humans? Answering in the affirmative, Barlow argued
that war should be conceived of as a continuum from the relatively
simple aggressions in animals to the more complex warfare in humans.
Defining war as existing whenever groups of animals have conflicts
with other groups of animals over limited resources, he identified
several parallels between biological wars and human wars concerning
territoriality, clan warfare, and ethnicity. The commonality between
biological and human warfare is that all of these conflicts are
based upon the perception of both kinship and limited resources.
Barlow then turned to an assessment of the possibilities for overcoming
man's propensity for warfare. While war once served a useful purpose
for humans, the high costs associated with modern, industrialized
warfare make war generally maladaptive. Although the costs associated
with modern war are now much greater than in the past, he conceded
that some are still using warfare successfully to achieve their
aims; examples are the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia and the
dominant Somali clans. Professor Barlow remains pessimistic about
the possibilities for achieving an end to warfare, but he concluded
that two avenues might hold promise. First, even in ethnic conflicts
such as the one in the former Yugoslavia, a minority of individuals
still rise above their kinship ties and refuse to participate
in the conflict. An examination of the motivations and perceptions
of these individuals, Barlow suggested, may shed light on a possible
solution. Second, mass communication might be used to stem the
division of society into the sub-groups (such as ethnic groups)
necessary for warfare.
In the lively panel discussion that followed, Peter Klopfer held
that animals relate differently to their siblings than they do
to non-siblings, even though no visible markings of kinship exist.
Klopfer asserted that this dynamic implies that the sense of kinship
is genetically based in animals. On the other hand, kinship for
humans is a social construct that may or may not be coincidental
with actual genetic relationships. Barlow granted that the mechanism
behind kinship recognition may differ between humans and animals,
but argued that this point did not really matter. Because Barlow
was merely using animals as an analogy, his key point was that
a great deal of human behavior is based on the perception of kinship.
Klopfer asked: If the underlying mechanism is different, what
do biologists have to contribute to the matters involving human
warfare? Barlow then reiterated his opinion that teaching merely
reinforces the genetic relationship and that the principles and
conclusions derived from kinship dynamics would remain the same.
Benson Ginsburg related the experience of Israel in its attempt
to address the issue of who should be counted as a Jew. The central
conflict was between biological kinship and cultural kinship;
the question arose as to whether the Jewish people entering Israel
were closer to each other as Jews or to their former nations.
In order to allay this tension, Israel substituted a universal
language, Hebrew, as the national language in place of the separate
national languages of new immigrants to build kinship ties within
the country.
During the question period, one audience member asked whether
any of the animals pursued what could be considered strategy in
their combat. Barlow responded that chimpanzees often used cooperative
behavior with effective tactics to achieve their ends, especially
in food acquisition. Extended battles often break out among these
animals over resources. Professor Klopfer, however, previewing
his later presentation, took exception to the entire notion of
Aanimal warfare and argued that animal behavior is distinct from
the sorts of conflicts that humans undertake. In specific regard
to chimps, he observed that a significant question exists in the
literature over the extent to which chimpanzees fight, noting
that a recent study argues that Awar-like chimpanzee behavior
has more to do with human perceptions than actual chimpanzee actions.
One other questioner suggested that evolutionary biology might
be used in two competing ways, either to establish a general rule
to be applied across all species or to reconstruct the adaptive
history of a single species, holding that the latter showed more
potential. Barlow agreed that the focus should be on the role
of adaptation in single species; even so, modern warfare would
be difficult to explain in a strictly biological manner.
Peter Klopfer began his presentation on AEvolutionary Processes
in the Development of Sociality with the statement that extrapolation
from one species to another most often is based upon fallacies.
In order to improve future efforts at such extrapolation, the
speaker examined four common misconceptions. Klopfer described
the first as the belief that one can speak of Agenes for a trait."
Implicit in most of the literature on the subject is the assumption
that it makes sense to speak of genes for aggression. Instead,
Klopfer argued that traits are the consequences of genes, the
environment, and the interaction between genes and the environment.
Because of the interaction variable, a one-to-one relationship
could never exist between any trait and the genetic or environmental
components. He suggested that a second fallacy occurs when researchers
assume that assigning identical names to disparate phenomena renders
the phenomena operationally similar. The speaker referred to a
fish species that defended a territory of varying size and shape
depending on the type of intruder. On the other hand, humans react
to aggression in a complex behavioral pattern including cognitive,
emotional, and motor aspects. Klopfer contended that while one
can refer to both Aaggressive fish and Aaggressive humans, these
two phenomena should not be treated as if they were the same,
observing that aggression is not an attribute of a subject such
as having five digits on a hand. Third, he identified the fallacy
of misplaced concreteness, defined as the assumption that functional
similarity is synonymous with ontogenetic similarity. The speaker
explained this aspect with reference to the concept of territoriality
(the prevention of encroachment into an animal's space). Researchers
in this field often assume that territoriality refers to a single
form of behavior. However, Klopfer asserted that most species
do not exhibit territoriality and that enormous variations exist
in behavior and purpose among species that are territorial; territoriality
is often used as a single word implying a single trait, yet it
applies to numerous forms of behavior. A fourth fallacy is the
assumption that the behavior of other animals serves better than
human behavior to explain human actions. Klopfer observed that
the animal kingdom contains such great diversity that any possible
human evolutionary pattern could find a compatible analogy from
some animal. He concluded with the statement that warfare is a
response to specific conditions and that a reliance upon genes
to explain behavior will not advance the understanding of war.
In the panel discussion, Barlow challenged some of Klopfer's claims.
Barlow stated that concepts such as aggression must be defined
operationally or the project will fail because researchers cannot
include notions of intentions and cognition in their models of
animal behavior. He also took exception to the notion that biologists
pick animal behavior to fit their preconceptions; evolutionary
biologists attempt to extract principles that can be applied to
humans from animal behavior and these insights should be used
as fresh ways of viewing human behavior rather than exact analogies.
Klopfer responded that attention should not focus on whether an
action such as infanticide in humans and other primates is evidence
of a common principal, but whether human infanticide is similar
to that seen in other animals. Barlow reiterated his view that
the value of citing other animals is to pose meaningful questions
about humans, not to pose an exact analogy. Joining the exchange,
Professor Ginsburg referred to the dynamics of funding to explain
part of the attention recently applied to the search for specific
genes to control particular behavior. While most researchers assume
that behavior is a heterogeneous phenomenon, granting agencies
tend to give money only for genetically-based studies. Ginsburg
argued that this Amythology of the genetic basis for all behavior
has entered the granting agency philosophy and has shut off discussion
of some points.
One member of the audience noted that the emphasis on the search
for a genetic cause of war may exist because of a desire to have
a clear-cut solution to warfare and to provide something easy
to manipulate. If environmental factors play a large role, then
a solution may be more difficult to discover. Barlow observed
that the answer to the question of whether war is caused by the
environment or genes is a complicated one. Humans change in response
to many different stimuli and the environment itself is complex
and changing. The best that can be hoped for is to try to extract
simple principles to see what can be discovered. Ronald Barfield
noted that part of the problem is that the questions asked of
biologists regarding warfare are too broad. The primary question
asked, in Barfield's view, is equivalent to Awhat about this war
thing?" He continued that political scientists and historians
need to provide better questions to guide biological research
regarding warfare. Another conference attendee commented on the
fact that humans can be motivated to fight by philosophy while
fish, for example, cannot, thus making animals a poor analogy
for human behavior. Barlow responded by relating that Che Guevara
said that revolution only occurs when a scarcity of resources
exists and philosophy is only a mechanism to motivate action in
response to disputes over resources. Because the scarcity of resources
remains the basis of the conflict, the use of philosophy to motivate
war would not deny the biological underpinnings. Ginsburg noted
that in addition to the scarcity of resources, a mentality pitting
"us against them and a charismatic leader were needed to
pull a society together for war. Leaders often use patriotism
to establish the kinship relationship to motivate a state's people
for war.
Benson Ginsburg referred to scholar Quincy Wright in his presentation
on AGenes, Experience, and Social Aggression." Ginsburg recalled
that Wright came into contact extensively with biologists at the
University of Chicago during his examination of war. This contact
seemed to have influenced Wright to infer that warfare is not
outside of human nature and led him to include a chapter on animals
in his famous treatise on war. Ginsburg pointed out that nature
is conservative in the manner in which genes are used in both
humans and animals -- ninety-six per cent of the DNA in humans
is also in chimpanzees. However, the genes in humans are organized
differently than even in chimpanzees. The speaker contended that
animal research can be useful in understanding humans; it can
give specific information that can be used to learn about the
similarities between humans and animals. Ginsburg referred to
animal social groups that are organized in hierarchies. These
organized social groups allow the collective, although not necessarily
the individual, to be better off than if the members of the group
were left to fend for themselves. Based on his research, the speaker
found that wolves raised apart from other wolves were still able
to behave in species-specific patterns. Ginsburg concluded that
social behavior is genetically based. In the animal kingdom, these
genetically based behavior patterns provide the social cement
for communication and group organization. In the modem nation-state,
patriotism serves as the bonding glue between individuals. Ginsburg
observed that while aggression might be based on genes, violence
as well as war are culturally derived phenomena that use aggression
as the basis for this behavior. In essence, humans are a hierarchical-structural
species with xenophobic tendencies, and these predispositions
are molded and manipulated in the service of warfare.
In the panel discussion, Klopfer held that genes do not make up
an organism's behavior, in the same sense that a dictionary cannot
write a sentence. Ginsburg agreed with this conclusion, noting
that there are genes for certain things, but just because an individual
has a gene does not mean that the behavior will arise in the same
manner between individuals. Barfield queried whether Ginsburg
could substantiate his differentiation between human aggression
and violence. Ginsburg responded that aggression (such as pushing)
can be observed occurring naturally in children, but violence
is learned from environmental sources such as the media and culture.
Studies have also shown that children will imitate the violent
behavior they observe. He continued that animals have such a tremendous
selection against violence that wolves will drive out an overly
aggressive member.
A commentator from the conference audience observed that Ginsburg's
presentation would seem to apply to the growth of violent crime
in the United States. Ginsburg responded that a characteristic
of human nature is to form hierarchical, social organizations.
At present, many of the social structures that have characterized
society such as the family, extended family, and community are
breaking down and being replaced by organizations such as gangs.
The solution to these problems might be attempts to form alternative
peer groups to instill different social values. Ginsburg concluded
that defective social organizations need to be replaced with other
proactive and preemptive hierarchical organizations.
Ronald Barfield based his presentation, AAnimal Models for the
Understanding of Human Aggression," on his research concerning
the effect of testosterone on animal behavior. Although rats become
less aggressive when castrated, the relationship between hormones
and behavior is more complicated in humans because of developmental
experiences. Barfield cautioned that if both human and animal
behavior of a specific type are not understood, researchers may
reach erroneous conclusions when attempting to compare them and
make generalizations. He remarked that it is comrnonly thought
that when a threat exists to a subsystem (such as mating, nesting,
or territoriality behavior) aggression is regulated by the hormone
testosterone. Barfield suggested, however, an alternate model
in which aggressive behavior is not directly affected by testosterone,
but rather in which aggression can be called into play with or
without testosterone. In addition, it has not yet been possible
to identify the site of the hormonal control of aggression. This
result, he contended, forces researchers to consider other determinants
of aggression such as context and experience and to move away
from hormonal determinants. In sum, Barfield concluded that aggression
is not a unitary drive system and that attention needs to be paid
to the entire system.
One member of the audience expressed the idea that human nature
as a cause of war seems indeterminate. Klopfer responded that
human nature is the outcome of a developmental process affected
by a multitude of factors. He contended that there is no operational
way to say that humans have hierarchical or xenophobic tendencies
because there is no basis for a comparison. The only possible
comparison is intra-species (cross-cultural) due to the fact that
there is no other human species with which to compare. Ginsburg
remarked that it does make sense to speak of a predisposition
for humans to have certain characteristics. Another questioner
raised the possibility that decisions to make war and individual
aggressive behavior could now be two separate phenomena because
the actual fighters may not be the ones who choose to go to war.
Ginsburg noted that the dehumanizing nature of war needed to be
examined. Using the example of a pilot during the Gulf War, Ginsburg
argued that individuals no longer have to engage their own feelings
in battle, but can just react to blips on the radar. Barlow differed
from this view and claimed that going to war in modern nations
still requires some degree of emotion that has to be mobilized
through mass communications. On the individual level, he observed
that pilots still get a "rush" when in planes during
combat, and modern warfare is not as free from emotion as assumed.
Another conference attendee held that most human activity is focused
on cooperation, rather than aggression, and cautioned that too
much emphasis should not be placed on war. Ginsburg replied that
a biological tendency for cooperation existed in all species and
has been exploited and manipulated q in humans for the purposes
of warfare.
One final questioner asked if, given a social science model of
Awar-like-ness" and two hypothetical communities, one that
was and one that was not war-like, biology could help disaggregate
the explanatory factors accounting for the two communities' characteristics?
Klopfer expressed a pessimistic view, noting that biology certainly
is part of the explanation for a society's behavior, but researchers
will not likely be capable of parceling out specific determinants
of outcomes. Barlow expressed a more optimistic viewpoint; he
contended that biology may be able to address a number of variables
of which genes might be one of the important ones. Ginsburg, in
a last comment, expressed doubt that genes could be deterministic
in this regard because of interaction with the Environment.
D.C.F.
Economics and War
Carolina Inn, Chapel Hill, N.C.
September 15, 1994
About the Speakers. TUSS invited four distinguished economists to make presentations about their discipline=s perspective on war. Craufurd D. Goodwin is James B. Duke Professor of Economics at Duke University. He has written extensively on economic thought and policy, higher education, and the economies of war and national defense, including editing Economics and National Security: A History of /Their Interaction (Duke University Press, 1991). Christopher M. Davis is Lecturer in Russian and East European Political Economy at Oxford University and a Fellow of Wolfson College. He has numerous publications to his credit on the economy, the health sector, and defense in the Soviet Union and its successor states. Charles Wolf, Jr., is Dean of the RAND Graduate School and Director of RAND=s research program in International Economics. He has written numerous articles and books on economics, defense, and international affairs, including Long-term Economic and Military Trends (1989)and Economic Transformation and the Changing International Economic Environment (1993). Martin Shubik is currently Seymour H. Knox Professor of Mathematical Institutional Economics at Yale University. He has written extensively on game theory and political economy. His recent works include The Mathematics of Conflict (1983) and Risk, Organizations, and Society: Studies in Risk and uncertainty (1991)
Conference
Proceedings.
After Richard Kohn welcomed the eighty people assembled for the
conference, Craufurd Goodwin addressed himself to AWhat Economists
Say about War, and Why. He noted that the subject of war could
be thought of as antithetical to what usually interests economists.
Economists generally dwell on equilibria -- war, however, represents
quintessential disequilibrium. Neoclassical economists like to
apply a model in which actors are economically rational -- under
conditions of war, however, their model is less likely to apply.
Furthermore, "Pareto-optimality," a game theoretic concept
whereby a certain outcome is assumed to be stable because players
cannot move without making at least one player worse off -- is
often used to explain outcomes by economists. In the case of war,
however, one party will necessarily be made worse off, so the
usefulness of this concept is limited. Finally, neoclassical economists
are resistant to assigning major analytical importance to the
state. War, however, is not fought by competitive firms.
For economists, the above considerations make war a subject that
is methodologically distasteful. Defense economics has had low
prestige within the discipline. Funding is episodic, and when
it does flow, it tends to come from agencies that clearly carry
an attitudinal bias regarding the subject. Nevertheless, Goodwin
stated that there has been some interesting work done by economists
on the subject of war.
He first discussed the fundamental issue of why there are wars.
The old "institutionalist" school of economics would
offer the dearth of international institutions as one important
cause. Economic studies from the 18th century discussed war in
terms of the failure of nation-states to enter into encompassing
contracts. Taking a different approach to the issue, Adam Smith
wrote that war could be a profitable investment for a country.
Peace, according to Smith, was bound to be unstable if a cost-benefit
calculation favored a decision to go to war.
Another more recent body of literature, which Thomas Schelling
leads, sees war as the result of competition run amok among nation-states.
This school of thought sees countries as oligopolistic firms.
Understood in this way, war and arms races are more an unintended
consequences of competition than tools for national self-aggrandizement.
In contrast to these micro-economic and classical analyses, the
historical-institutionalist current of economics literature more
often uses macro-economic models and tends to conceive of actors
as boundedly-rational. Some economists from this school have hypothesized
that war is related to the early stages of a country accumulating
national wealth. There is, it is claimed, a changing attitude
toward war during the nation-building stage. This theory is used
to account for Germany's and Japan's aggressive behavior. These
countries had not yet developed wasteful consumption habits, possessed
a surplus of resources, and applied them to war-making projects.
A different sort of "historical-institutionalist" line
of analysis, perhaps best represented by John K. Galbraith's work
on the Vietnam War, abandons the neo-classicists assumption that
war is a consequence of the actions of rational actors. Galbraith
found that US leaders trapped themselves into adhering to their
initial explanation for the war in Southeast Asia, which revolved
around a perceived Soviet-Chinese conspiracy. Galbraith also asserted
that there were sub-national interest groups in the West who could
benefit from the war.
Historical institutionalists also link war to the truism that
people do not want to starve. Based on a rough sort of empiricism,
it is claimed that people place their demand for employment ahead
of political values. When the business cycle is at its low point,
people are more likely to be attracted by the rhetoric of aggressively
nationalist politicians like Hitler or a Mussolini, who in turn
are more likely to begin wars.
Turning to the issue of what economics has to say about the question
of how to prevent war, Goodwin first noted that those who focused
on the absence of institutions as a source of war naturally advocate
their establishment as a means of preventing it. In other words,
efforts should be made to move away from nation-states existing
in a Hobbesian "state of nature." Institutional devices
can be designed to help resolve disputes. Thinking of the problem
as analogous to one those occurring in national-level politics,
an industrial relations model could be extended to problems of
international relations.
If one adheres to Adam Smith=s analysis of the causes of war,
understanding it as the intentional product of a cost-benefit
calculation, the most obvious way to prevent it is to do whatever
possible to ensure that the costs of war exceed the benefits for
potential aggressors. Measures to accomplish this end could include
rules against prize-taking, insuring that the costs of a military
build-up are clearly revealed, and the integration of the international
economy such that trade dependence can make war less profitable.
Another prescription would be to constrain competition in expenditures
and arms races through alliance formation and arms control. Goodwin
noted that some economists have gone so far as to defend empires
as a way of reducing direct Great Power competition. In the twentieth
century, one finds analysts who portray the European Community
(Union) and the Association of South Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN)
as ways to reduce inter-state competition. Finally, economists
concerned with the allegedly aggressive predilections of business
leaders would have the state maintain a safe distance in its relationships
with such actors.
If privation causes war, then one plausible way to avert it would
be to maintain full employment in the industrialized democracies.
This principle could be seen as a driving force in the policies
of the United States for twenty-five years following World War
II, as reflected in the Marshall Plan and the creation of a foreign
aid institution, the Agency for International Development. More
recently, however, such policies have faded in importance, as
has the mode of analysis apparently behind them.
Turning to what economists have to say about the costs of war,
Goodwin said that the question could not be answered until two
paradoxes were confronted. The first is that countries defeated
in war often experience subsequent vigorous growth. One explanation
for this phenomenon derived mostly from social psychological analysis
hypothesizes that defeat reinforces the attitudes and beliefs
that lie behind peoples' savings and investment behavior. Such
behavior contributes to growth following defeat. The second paradox
is that although the destruction of a country's capital stock
should reduce national output, Caldor, Baran, and Galbraith, found
that strategic bombing tends to increase productivity in the targeted
area. They argue that the bombing has unexpected effects on incentives
and time variables.
Economists are much more at home doing research on the issue of
the trade-off between quantity and quality of armaments, or "bang
for the buck.." They generally apply the same logic that
they would apply to marketable goods. The widgets in this case,
however, happen to be items like the B-1 bomber and the nuclear
submarines. The economists' marginal cost-benefit analysis, however,
runs up against some countervailing forces, notably powerful business
interests, armed service rivalries, and bureaucratic rules of
thumb.
Some economists, such as Milton Friedman, have recommended market
mechanisms to deal with the problems of defense armaments, while
others have preferred more heterodox approaches. The latter, notably
the economists of the New Deal, had the opportunity to experiment
with some tools of a command economy during World War II. Detractors
of a market approach note that there may be several socially undesirable
outcomes of letting laissez faire govern a system of national
defense. First, regarding the acquisition of human resources,
these critics have expressed concern that an all-volunteer army
will disproportionately be composed of the poor and underprivileged.
Second, they have argued that manufactured war goods have tended
to be produced by oligopolists, rather than by a large number
of competing producers, and that government intervention and regulation
is therefore necessary. A related argument is that a market in
defense goods would not be able to adapt rapidly enough to huge
surges in the demand for product that could suddenly arise in
a war situation. Third, some have argued that raw materials supplies
must be protected from the possibility that market forces might
lead to their premature exhaustion.
In his conclusion, Goodwin offered some observations about the
readiness of the discipline of economics to contribute to the
study of war. He said that he felt that economics is no longer
positioned to contribute to the questions about the causes of
war or the costs of war. This is due in part to the fact that
the discipline has taken a strong turn toward prioritizing the
development of abstract models and away from questions about institutions
and other issues requiring the use of qualitative data. Game theory
models, he argued, have contributed to social scientists' understanding
of superpower rivalry and conflict, but have contributed little
to understanding such events as the Gulf War and U.S. intervention
in Somalia and Haiti. The discipline does stand ready to contribute
on the question of bang for the buck in a war-fighting system.
Finally, Goodwin noted that one can reverse the question of how
much economics has helped us to understand war and instead ask
how war has helped spur growth in the understanding of economics.
Many economists have had their thinking profoundly altered by
the experience of war, because it has forced them to confront
real world conditions not always dealt with in the discipline.
During the comment and question and answer period Charles Wolf
commented that he thought it important to attempt to distinguish
between what economists say as economists and what they say as
political actors. He suspects, for instance, that Adam Smith's
writings on war can be more appropriately interpreted as falling
under the latter category than the former.
Concerning what economics currently is likely to contribute to
the study of war, there was some disagreement from Goodwin's fellow
panelists. Charles Wolf argued that currently there is interesting
research being conducted on democratization and changes in information
flows that might contribute to peace. Martin Shubik added that
advances in mathematically based institutional economics will
allow economics to have more to say about war than in the past.
An audience member pointed out that some economists have studied
the issue of warfare against another country's economy through
sanctions, citing the work of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot.
One conference participant argued that a potential cause of some
wars has been that decision makers have listened to "bad"
economists and made improper decisions. This allegedly was the
case during the inter-war period in Europe, when attention was
distracted from Hitler's racist drive for expansion by the supposed
need to recognize Germany's economic grievances. Martin Shubik
responded that there are of course many causes of war, and that
what seems to be in one case a particularly powerful set of explanatory
variables illuminated by one discipline may become virtually irrelevant
in another.
Christopher Davis provided an analysis of some of the similarities
and differences between Quincy Wright's treatment of economics
and war in his 1941 book, A Study of War, and that of Marxist
and Soviet economists. Davis argued that Wright neither distinguished
himself as an economic theorist nor included much in the way of
empirical analysis of any economic issues. Though Wright rarely
referred to the work of Marxist or Soviet economists, Davis argued
that the idea of comparing them is not too farfetched.
First, Wright and the Marxist economists both were attentive to
the issue of the evolution of civilizations and the relationship
of this process to war. Like the Marxists, Wright tried to link
various types of civilizations with characteristics that were
particularly likely to make them war-prone. Both Wright and the
Marxists were attentive to the relationship between technology
and war. Where they sharply differ, however, is their hypotheses
about the relationship between capitalism and war. While Wright
believed that modern capitalism is the most peaceful of systems,
Marxists have of course emphasized how the development of states
dominated by the interests of finance capital is linked to imperialistic
warfare.
Marxist economists have said far more than Wright on the subject
of the economic consequences of warfare. Marxists acknowledge
that war can both cause the destruction of natural resources and
cause technology to progress (though this progress generally is
greatest in the nonproductive sphere of the economy). War also
is believed by Marxist economists to discredit the ruling class,
contributing to the eventual overthrow of the mode of production
and an elevation to a higher stage of economic development.
On the topic of what economics has to say about preventing war,
Wright argued that financial incentives had to be attached to
a system of institutions that in their turn would help nations
disarm and preserve peace. For Marx and Lenin, however, disarmament
was not conceivable in an era of finance capital or in a period
when capitalist and socialist nation-states compete against one
another. In the subsequent discussion, Charles Wolf pointed out
the Wright's book is not social scientific in the sense of trying
to make causal arguments, but is instead more encyclopedic and
taxonomic. Alex Roland agreed, noting that the pre-science stage
of an academic discipline often revolves around the production
of a few viable taxonomies. Marxist economists who have studied
war, on the other hand, quite clearly have a theory of causation.
Wolf also argued that we need to disaggregate the concept of "warfare"
given numerous past and present forms of conflict. One should
not attempt to analyze global conventional war, local conventional
war, police actions, unilateral actions, and other diverse forms
of international conflict in the same way. Finally, one participant
noted that the idea of the correlation of forces, which derives
from Marxist economics, can be useful in discussing how nations
go about waging war. Balance of payments theory may be relevant
for the study of the conduct of war, and even for the issue of
the sustainability of peace.
Entitling his talk AA happier side to the dismal science? Charles
Wolf presented three non-dismal, realistic propositions concerning
economics and war. He claimed that (1) economic factors can be
instrumental in avoiding war; (2) the economic causes of war are
minor and diminishing; and (3) that the formerly distinct metrics
of economic power and military power are blurring.
Wolf argued that we still have not yet fully grasped the significance
of the recent U.S. "victory" in a Great Power struggle
that never reached the point of becoming a "hot war."
This historically significant event was heavily influenced by
economic factors. Economic performance in the Soviet Union exhibited
constantly declining rates of reported growth as the country staggered
under the burden of an overdeveloped military and extensive external
"empire." Furthermore, the economic performance outside
the Soviet Union contributed to growing skepticism within the
Soviet Union over Khrushchev's famous prediction that the Soviet
Union would bury the West. Doubt accumulated within the Soviet
bureaucracy as the West enjoyed relatively strong growth in the
1980s.
Wolf argues that in part, the United States attempted to manipulate
economic factors in order to hasten the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Wolf did not try to assign a relative weight to the influence
of U.S. economic strategy against U.S. military strategy in "winning"
the Cold War . He noted that some analysts have argued that the
United States could have saved itself some money on defense expenditures
because it underestimated how badly the Soviet Union was doing.
Wolf argued that there was a fine line that US decision makers
had to be careful not to cross in making and publicizing these
judgments: if they had repeatedly played up the relative gaps
between Western and Eastern economic performance, hardliners in
the Soviet Union might have been strengthened. Such a development
would not have served the purpose of bringing the Cold War to
a peaceful end favoring the West.
Wolf's second main point was that economic causes of war are minor
and diminishing. He dismissed the idea that the US went to war
against Iraq because of the issue of control over a natural resource,
oil, although he did note that control of additional resources
would have accelerated Saddam's ability to wield weapons of mass
destruction. Economic research reveals, Wolf said, that natural
resources and economic size are not very important for economic
development. Instead, he stated that technological progress is
more important in independently accounting for economic growth.
Economic conflict, Wolf argued, is unlikely to be transformed
into military conflict.
Finally, Wolf asserted that the distinctions between economic
power and military power increasingly are becoming blurred and
perhaps less important. He pointed to the examples of dual-use
technology and the use of military logistics in humanitarian interventions.
Furthermore, research is progressing on whether economic inducements,
of either a positive or negative nature, can be effective in attaining
state goals. For instance, Rand researchers are beginning to suspect
that for wealthier countries, the use of economic penalties may
be effective, whereas in cases of relations with poorer countries,
positive economic inducements are more likely to be effective.
Following Wolf=s talk, a number of comments were made on the instrumental
use of economic factors in the United States-Soviet rivalry. One
person noted that the West waged economic warfare in a number
of ways against the Soviet Union since at least the 1940s, so
these strategies could hardly be treated as an innovation of the
Reagan era. Another pointed out that the growth rate of the Soviet
economy had been declining since 1965, well before the Carter
and Reagan spending spurts on strategic arms and defense systems.
Wolf responded generally that what was especially important during
the 1980s was a combination of factors: Soviet deteriorating economic
performance; and the bolstering of the NATO military shield to
deter Soviet Union decision makers from developing a "use
it or lose it" mentality.
One participant asked if the Paul Kennedy thesis about imperial
overstretch and the rise and decline of great powers offered any
insight about the future of the United States. Wolf responded
by saying he does not think that U.S. military spending is a major
drain on national wealth, citing an estimate that defense spending
accounts for four percent of U.S. GDP. Related to this point was
a suggestion by another participant that at times in history it
seems as though there are such things as free lunches: military
spending need not be correlated with a decline in economic growth,
as evidenced by the United States experience during the World
War II rearmament years.
Addressing the subject of ATerrorism, technology and the socio-economics
of death,Martin Shubik devoted his presentation to the economic
rationality of investments by state and non-state actors in biological
warfare technology.
Shubik drew participants' attention to the potential lethality
of small, well-organized, reasonably-well financed terrorist groups.
Such groups may be financed by third parties, complicating the
question that defense analysts ask about who one needs to defend
oneself against. During the Cold War, there were fairly clear
definitions of deterrence, as well as a clear understanding of
who one=s friends and enemies were. This is no longer the case.
In twenty years or so, Shubik asserts, developments in biotechnology
could produce a situation in which one or two individuals could
develop and use biological weapons.
To provide a reference point, Shubik provided the audience with
an estimate of the cost of acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear
power requires a financial investment of about $200 million. Biological
warfare, however, currently requires around only $10 million,
and this cost should decline with time.
The logic of developing biological weapons is, unfortunately,
compelling from an economic standpoint. Economists have long argued
that the industries likely to grow most quickly are those featuring
low entry-costs for new firms, a relatively small plant size,
products with multiple uses, a high growth potential, and relatively
cheap inputs. Two biological weapons Aindustries fit these criteria
well: the production of anthrax and botulism.
Economics has also contributed to military operations research,
an area that also points to the "advantages" of biological
weapons. According to Shubik. military operations research is
interested in the costs of killing. Recent improvements in international
communications technology have increased dramatically the permeability
of the nation-state. While "old" terrorist technology
has been capable of killing only relatively small numbers of people,
such as the 250 killed in the Beirut Marine barracks truck bombing,
the "new" technology changes things dramatically. Biological
weapons are the ultimate as far as "bang for the buck"
is concerned. "Entrepreneurs" in the biological weapons
industry do not have to innovate much to produce a product with
plenty of bang. Some of the previously high costs of production
brought on by the handling and delivery of the material have been
lowered dramatically by virtue of the development of such things
as aerosol devices. Finally, Shubik noted that Acounter-technology,
such as inoculations and damage control measures is to date far
less well-developed and tends to be very expensive.
Shubik concluded in part by saying that one question that needs
to be researched is why have things to date been so good, considering
the likelihood of the imaginable horrific scenarios involving
biological warfare technology and small groups of political actors.
In order to approach this issue, disciplines other than economics
will be more helpful, such as social psychology. When one thinks
about various defensive measures effective in reducing risks posed
by potentially "dangerous" groups, questions immediately
come up regarding civil liberties and freedom of information.
Dealing with such issues obviously also falls outside the purview
of economics.
In the comment and question period, one person asked if what Shubik
is talking about is really a police issue rather than a subject
related to the study of war. Shubik responded that what appears
to be a small group terrorist action may in fact be sponsored
by some other country. When one considers a scenario in which
hypothetical countries one and two are involved in a tense situation,
and country three sponsors a biological attack on one or both,
it could set off an all-out conflict between one and two that
somehow benefits country three.
Another questioner raised the issue of the rationality of large
organizations (especially nation-states) utilizing weapons against
which they have no means of defense in the event of retaliation.
Shubik responded that if we first set aside the issue of "psychopaths"
using such weapons (on the grounds that such cases are not instances
of "war"), there is still the important problem of an
attacked nation distinguishing friends from enemies and enemies
from terrorists.
Sociology and War
The North Carolina State University Faculty Club
Raleigh, N.C.
November 18, 1994
About the
Speakers. Four sociologists with diverse theoretical orientations
agreed to participate in our workshop by discussing their discipline=s
contributions to the study of war. Michael Mann is Professor of
Sociology and Associate Director of the Center for European and
Russian Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles,
where he has worked since 1987. He has written extensively on
the relationship between war, the state, and society. Some of
his recent publications include States, War and Capitalism (1990),
The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and
Nation-States, 1760-1914 (1993), and ANation-States in Europe
and other continents: diversifying, developing, not dying, Daedalus
122 (3), Summer 1993. Martin Shaw is Professor of Political and
International Sociology and Head of the Department of Sociology
and Anthropology at the University of Hull, England. He has contributed
to numerous academic journals and collections on both sides of
the Atlantic. Some of his recent publications include Dialectics
of War: An Essay on the Social Theory of War and Peace (1988),
Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at
the End of the Twentieth Century (1991), and Global Society and
International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives
(1994). He is now working on a new book, Distant Violence: Media
and Civil Society in Global Crises (forthcoming, 1995). James
Burk is currently Associate Professor of Sociology at Texas A
& M University. A fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on
Armed Forces and Society, he is the incoming editor of that society=s
journal, Armed Forces and Society. His recent work includes contributions
to and editorship of The Military in New Times (1994) and authorship
of APower, Morals, and Military Uniqueness in Society (November/December
1993). Laura Miller is a Ph.D. candidate at Northwestern University.
Her publications include AFighting for a Just Cause: Soldiers
Attitudes on Gays in the Military, in Wilbur J. Scott and Sandra
Carson Stanley, eds., Gays and Lesbians in the Military: Issues,
Concerns, and Contrasts (1994) and (with Charles Moskos) AHumanitarians
or Warriors? Race, Gender and Combat Status in Operation Restore
Hope, Armed Forces and Society (forthcoming).
Michael Mann addressed the 50 conference participants with a talk
entitled "A Macro-Sociological Approach to the History of
War." Mann focused on militarism, which he defined as "the
persistent use of organized violence in pursuit of social goals,"
as it related to the different development patterns of modern
authoritarian and liberal states. He contended that militarism
was central to the historical experience of both types of societies,
while the inherently different material and ideological structures
of each state determined the form which that militarism would
take. Authoritarian states, such as Germany and Russia/Soviet
Union display what he called "militarism of the neighborhood"
because their security concerns resided almost totally on their
immediate borders. As a result, they had large standing military
establishments that were extremely visible in the lives of the
domestic population. In contrast, Mann ascribed "militarism
of the globe" to liberal states such as Britain, it former
colonies, and the United States. Their militaries were generally
stationed abroad and globally oriented, both removing the armed
forces from daily contact with the population and engendering
what Mann called "spectator sport militarism."
Mann argued that during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries
both types of state legitimized themselves through different forms
of popular sovereignty, the authoritarian through mass mobilization,
and the liberal through democracy. At the same time, modern ideology
infused both states with a sense of mission. In authoritarian
states the state itself was presented as the bearer of this moral
project, while in liberal states the moral project was diffused
throughout the individuals who made up civil society. In both
instances, but at different times, violent racism became central
to the national ideologies, but the way the ideology was translated
into policy was a function of the type of militarism that characterized
a particular society. Mann pointed to the clearly state-led racial
militarism of National Socialist Germany as an example of the
former, while the exterminationist settler policies in places
like Australia epitomized civil-society militarism in which the
state was either absent or just a bystander to civilian initiatives.
In other words, liberal states, led by elements within civil-society,
have displayed a tendency to seek lebensraum similar to authoritarian
states when a group was defined as outside the moral boundaries
of the nation as defined by popular sovereignty. However, the
key phenomenon, which occurred in authoritarian states as well,
was the initiative and active participation of civil-society in
militaristic activity, whether in conjunction with or in the absence
of state leadership.
During the panel discussion, James Burk asked whether Mann saw
any fundamental differences in the racism that characterized liberal
and authoritarian societies, given the distinct ideological rationales
behind each. Mann replied that the key element of the racism in
both instances was the identification of certain groups as "others,"
conceptualized as beyond the pale of the in-group's society. In
short, he perceived no basic differences. Martin Shaw then expressed
reservations about the importance that Mann had ascribed to civil-society
militarism. He wondered whether the broader historical context
which included the progressive intensification of state militarism
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not provide
a more useful basis for analyzing the increasing militarism of
society in general. He gave the example of the advent of total
war, which militarized politics and society, as the crucial link
between militarism on the one hand and totalitarianism and genocide
on the other. Mann agreed with this explanation for the majority
of the twentieth century, but reminded the audience that the civil-society
led genocides of indigenous peoples by settlers had largely ended
before World War I, rendering an analysis in terms of total war
anachronistic. He saw civil-society militarism as a latent force
that could possibly regain its former significance in the changing
post-Cold War world.
Martin Shaw commenced his lecture "Analyzing the Fragmentary
Peace: New Challenges for the Sociology of War and Militarism"
with the contention that sociologists who study war have traditionally
focused too exclusively on the role of war in society rather than
analyzing its nature as a distinctive kind of social action. Shaw
described Clausewitz as the theorist who first showed the inner
character or war to be a process of social action. Clausewitz
proposed two limits on absolute warfare, political context and
friction, that Shaw used to illustrate war's changing nature in
the twentieth century. Increasingly, states tried to overcome
these limits by deepening the degree to which their societies
were organized for war, with greater levels of total war demanding
greater levels of social mobilization. This social participation
provided the political context that limited a government's options,
while the great difficulties in sustaining and fighting a total
war created the friction.
Shaw then noted that the advent and spread of nuclear weapons
in the two decades after World War II had essentially abolished
both friction and political context as limits to war's destructive
power. This development uncoupled total war from total social
mobilization, opening up space for a "post-military society"
to evolve. This process has split the world into two spheres:
a precariously pacified core and a periphery of conventional warfare.
From this situation, Shaw saw the concomitant rise of what he
calls the "Western state" as the major transition of
international relations since 1945. He described the Western state
as an extended framework of state power, which has emerged since
the end of the Cold War as the core of a "global state"
utilizing the United Nations as a legitimizing framework.
Shaw concluded by proposing an agenda for future work on the sociology
of war. He stated that the discipline needs both a theoretical
historical sociology of war and an empirical sociological analysis
of current wars in the context of civil society.
During the ensuing discussion, Michael Mann inquired about the
process through which the Western state was becoming the global
state. Shaw replied that the Cold War had kept the system that
concentrated around the Western powers from becoming a global
one, but that the end of a Soviet alternative to a Western state
has facilitated the broadening of its security framework and the
growing sense that legitimacy for its actions radiates from the
United Nations. Alex Roland asked both Shaw and Mann how one differentiates
between war and other forms of social violence if one does not
take the state as the primary actor. Claiming a Weberian heritage,
Roland questioned whether studying war as a phenomenon below the
state level might not be a slippery slope toward no clear definition
at all. Mann replied, and Shaw concurred, that one could distinguish
a war for the purposes of sociological analysis by determining
whether the combatants were fighting over the constitution of
their political order, whether that be domestic, racial, or international.
At this point, another conference participant asked how the historical
profession could help in Shaw's proposed new look at the sociology
of war. Shaw answered that the two disciplines should work together,
with historians providing the empirical grist for the sociologist's
theoretical mill.
James Burk began the afternoon session with a talk entitled "Major
Trends in Civil-Military Relations." He argued that the issue
of civil-military relations has only become a pressing one for
the United States since the advent of the Cold War, when it became
clear that the large standing military establishment would be
maintained for the foreseeable future. Since then, sociologists
have generally been concerned with two broad issues: the social
isolation of the contemporary military and the social standing
of the officer corps.
Regarding the first issue, sociologists originally feared that
the standing military would become increasingly isolated from
democratic society. Burk noted that empirical research has not
borne out these sociologists= concerns that the military would
diverge from society. Instead, he remarked that the military and
society in general have come closer together. For instance, the
military must now respond to market forces in order to recruit
personnel. Additionally, Congress now exercises a much more intrusive
and aggressive oversight of the military budget than it did in
the 1950s and early 1960s. Therefore, Burk concluded, the increasing
strains in civil-military relations result from closer contact
between these two protagonists rather than their isolation from
one another.
Concerning the social standing of the officer corps, Burk noted
the debate between Morris Janowitz, who argued that the standing
army would blur the boundaries between society and the military,
and Samuel Huntington, who contended that only profound isolation
between civilian society and the officer corps could foster military
professionalism and military security. Burk argued that there
has been a tendency for society to make increasing demands on
the military establishment, while its deference to professional
military authority decreased markedly. He suggested that the public
is skeptical of all professions, but that this has a particularly
important effect on the military, which must communicate with
the civil-society regarding matters of national security. His
prescription for the future of civil-military relations is to
create a corps of "soldier-scholars" whose job it would
be to bring expert opinions to the public debate without partisanship
or advocacy in order to inform the public.
Michael Mann began the panel discussion by questioning the practicality
of Burk's "soldier-scholar" model, wondering whether
it would degrade military professionalism. Burk answered that
he was not advocating that all individual officers become soldier-scholars;
rather, he saw it as an institutional response to a current need.
He said that a small group of officers would be picked and trained
for such a role, functioning as a buffer between a thoroughly
professionalized officer corps and the political establishment.
He insisted that the presence of a small number of officers in
the soldier-scholar role would not undermine the professional
ethic of the entire corps because the two capacities could easily
exist together. Martin Shaw then observed that he thought military
affairs, especially the budget, involved too many vested interests
to make such a detached attitude feasible.
At that point, a questioner asked whether or not perhaps military
values were diverging from the broader society, even as they were
coming together in other ways. He used as an example the decline
in deference to obedience in civil society, compared to the need
for that quality in military personnel. Burk answered that he
agreed with the questioner's assessment of obedience in civil
society, but believed that the military had also followed this
social movement because it has de-emphasized blind obedience and
stressed initiative at lower levels of command. What Burk did
not know, was whether the gap between the military and civil society
on this issue was growing or shrinking.
Regarding the soldier-scholar, Richard Kohn expressed concern
that Burk's proposal placed the entire onus for relieving the
current strain in civil-military relations on the military itself
rather than on the civilian leadership. Burk replied by stressing
the importance of public opinion and the practical reality that
the public expected this kind of broad strategic thinking from
the military, and that only the military was in a position to
make the long-term institutional changes necessary to create effective
communications with society.
Laura Miller began her presentation, "Women Soldiers and
the Changing Face of War" by questioning the relevance of
the traditional assumption that large scale war involves primarily
bloody ground combat with more or less clearly demarcated front
and rear zones of operation. This scenario has generally bolstered
arguments against allowing women into combat, but Miller contended
that the changing nature of military technology has both obliterated
the distinction between front and rear and made military operations
more fluid, blurring the distinction between combat and non-combat
personnel. She cited the recent experiences of United States troops
in Somalia and Haiti, as well as in the Persian Gulf, to suggest
that several models exist that do not include protracted ground
fighting, but involve either unconventional missions or standard
operations within a greatly expanded battlefield. In these situations,
attempts to protect women from danger become less relevant. She
argued that empirical data does not corroborate the notion that
the American public will not tolerate female casualties: more
precisely, it appears that Americans will tolerate almost no casualties
at all. Additionally, she maintained that the data show that men
and women have proven themselves capable of working together in
all manner of military specializations without a breakdown of
discipline or morale.
Martin Shaw began the panel discussion with the observation that
the increasing role of women in warfare has generally led the
way for greater gains by women in society at large. He then asked
why the movement to include women in military roles had not progressed
farther in countries other than the United States. Miller answered
that she saw a general correlation between the level of technology
that a military employed and the degree to which it utilized women.
As the most technologically sophisticated military establishment
in the world, the United States has more opportunities to employ
women outside of the standard ground war scenario. James Burk
then asked why technology played such a key role in this equation,
when the issue of unit cohesion usually dominates the debate over
women in combat. Miller answered the issue of unit cohesion by
pointing to empirical data that suggests that women in heavy support
roles quickly gained the acceptance of their male counterparts
through a process of socialization. Regarding technology, she
said that the expansion of more cerebral specialties tended to
undermine the issue of physical strength in debating women=s'
participation.
Richard Kohn argued that he was pessimistic about the society
accepting women in combat roles because it would mean female participation
in any potential future drafts. Arguing against the assumption
that another mass-war was unlikely, he expressed concern over
whether society was ready to accept a situation where able-bodied
men remained behind while women were drafted. Miller concurred
that this was a salient issue, observing that fear over female
conscription partially motivated opposition to the ERA. However,
she raised the issue of post-traumatic stress syndrome and the
vast empirical evidence of large numbers of men avoiding modern
war in order to question the traditional notion that war was a
uniquely masculine activity. She contrasted the total government
commitment to racial integration of the military with the piecemeal
approach to female participation, which, she argued, has itself
engendered much of institutional backlash against allowing women
into traditional combat roles.
Law
and War
January 20, 1995
The Thomas Center, Fuqua School of Business
Duke University
About the Speakers. John Norton Moore is the Walter L. Brown Professor
of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and directs
the University=s Center for National Security Law and the Center
for Oceans Law & Policy. He chaired the American Bar Association=s
Standing Committee on Law and National Security for five terms.
He is the author or editor of eighteen books and over 140 articles
and served for two decades on the editorial board of the American
Journal of International Law. Leslie Green is University Professor
Emeritus and Honorary Professor of Law at the University of Alberta.
He has written extensively on a variety of aspects of international
law and especially on the law of armed conflict, his most important
works in the field being Essays on the Modern Law of War (1984)
and The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (1993), which was based
on the draft he prepared for the Canadian Department of Defence
for its Manual of War Law. Ruth Wedgwood is Professor of Law at
Yale University Law School, and Senior Fellow and Director of
the Project on International Organizations and Law at the Council
on Foreign Relations. She has written on proportionality in the
use of force, the national security decision making process, the
law of war crimes, and the law of the United Nations. James P.
Terry is a colonel in the United States Marine Corps. He has served
as Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
since June 1992. His career includes service in Vietnam as well
as more than twenty years as a military lawyer. He has also written
numerous articles on military law and policy including AThe Evolving
U.S. Policy for Peace Operations, 19 Southern Illinois University
(1994), and AOperation Desert Storm: Stark Contrasts in Compliance
with the Rule of Law, 41 Naval Law Review (1993). Yoram Dinstein
is President of Tel Aviv University, where he is also Professor
of International Law and Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights. He
has written extensively on subjects relating to international
law, human rights, and laws of armed conflict. He is the founder
and editor of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (20 volumes
of which have been issued in English since 1971). His other publications
include a six-volume treatise (in Hebrew) on international law.
His latest book in English is War, Aggression and Self-Defence
(2nd edition, 1994.)
Conference
Proceedings. With slightly over ninety persons in attendance,
John Norton Moore led off the conference with a presentation entitled
"Democracy, Deterrence and War: Toward a New Paradigm in
War Avoidance and Foreign Policy." Moore opened by cautioning
that many of our traditional assumptions about war causation and
avoidance are easily undermined due to the wide variation in the
empirical record and welter of different theoretical explanations.
Scholars face a confusing taxonomy of civil wars, international
struggles, and low intensity conflicts with little that would
enable them meaningfully to compare these struggles. Further complicating
our study of war is the fact that many of its perceived causes
are not necessarily linked. Equally disappointing are our traditional
theories of war avoidance, whose weaknesses seem to outweigh their
merits. For example, while military strength is one component
of deterrence, analyses focusing on the creation of a balance
of power often fail to consider elements of deterrence such as
communications between governments, the role of government structures,
and expectations of authorities in other countries. Moore argued
that, despite these problems, the United States has consistently
sought to follow the Holy Grail of war avoidance in pursuit of
its foreign policy goals.
In addition to war avoidance, the most important United States
foreign policy objectives have been the promotion of human rights,
the protection of our own environment and the global environment,
and economic development. To achieve these four goals, the United
States should do all in its power to foster the creation of stable
democracies worldwide. Democracy, Moore suggested, would check
the aggression in the nature of man that is so often magnified
by totalitarianism. Governments with a system of checks and balances
preventing the concentration of power not only tend to avoid wars,
but are also unlikely to engage in the crime of democide??the
mass slaughter of a nation's population by its own government.
Drawing upon the work of Rudolph J. Rummel, Moore noted that,
during the twentieth?century, nearly 80 percent of mass deaths
have resulted from democide conducted by totalitarian states while
war can account for only 19.6 percent of instances involving massive
loss of life.
In addition to the protection and promotion of human rights, democratic
structures would assist our foreign policy goal of economic development.
Politically open societies subscribing to the rule of law and
market allocation of resources grow at dramatic rates, thus ensuring
a healthy economic climate. Lastly, in terms of our goal of war
avoidance, healthy democratic states would be less likely to engage
in aggression. In a survey of more than 350 conflicts occurring
between 1815 and 1991, Moore noted that only a tiny minority were
caused by democracies behaving in an aggressive manner. Indeed,
despite the best efforts of collective security or the use of
third parties to settle disputes, the major conflicts of the twentieth?century
appear consistently to fit the picture of a non?democratic regime
deciding to wage war.
Moore's contention that democracies do not initiate wars drew
the greatest criticism during the lively panel discussion that
followed. Pointing to the Mexican and Spanish?American Wars, Yoram
Dinstein questioned the assertion that democratic nations are
always the defender and totalitarian states the aggressor in international
conflicts. Moore responded to this criticism by arguing that such
counter-examples are few in number and should not bury the usefulness
of the data underpinning his survey. While conceding that democracies
can use force in an aggressive manner, Moore argued that the majority
of the wars occurring between 1816 and 1991 indicate that totalitarian
regimes are far more likely to force an outbreak of war. Aside
from Dr. Dinstein's contention that Moore had ignored wars launched
by democracies, panel members also found Moore's America-centrism
disturbing. Canadian Leslie Green raised the point that what is
in the best interest of the United States may not necessarily
be in the interest of other democracies. Nor might other nations
share our concept of what democracy is, a point countered by Moore's
argument that the democratic ideal is worldwide and not peculiarly
American.
Following Moore's presentation, Leslie C. Green spoke on "Enforcing
the Law in International and Non?International Conflicts."
Dr. Green opened with a review of efforts by nations throughout
history to check abuses by their armed forces during wartime.
Although codes of military conduct have lengthy histories, as
indicated by their inclusion in the biblical book of Deuteronomy,
it was not until the end of the nineteenth?century that the first
international codification of the laws of war appeared. Prior
to conventions held in 1899 and 1907, laws regarding war crimes
drew upon customary rather than treaty law. The years following
the world wars witnessed increased efforts, such as the 1929 Geneva
Convention and the Genocide Convention of 1948, to define what
was and was not permissible during war. The height of this trend
to create worldwide standards of conduct arrived during the late
1970s in an international movement to try war criminals who had
participated in multi?national conflicts. However, punishment
and enforcement of these conventions has too frequently been left
to individual nations due to the lack of international tribunals.
In his concluding remarks Dr. Green pointed to several troubling
aspects of international attempts to circumscribe the actions
of individual soldiers. Foremost of these concerns is that there
is no clear law governing internal wars of liberation and whether
or not civil wars are struggles subject to international codes
of conduct. Given that enforcing the law of war is often left
up to individual nations, a danger exists that, in the wake of
a civil war, successful rebels will turn war crimes trials into
acts of vengeance hidden behind an international code of conduct
concerning humanity.
In the panel discussion that followed, Dr. Dinstein seconded Green's
concern about the lack of law covering unconventional military
conflict. Equally troublesome, according to Dinstein, is the fact
that international tribunals have not effectively handled the
distinction between an international conflict and a civil war
and thus determined what is permissible and what is not in these
struggles. Joining the discussion over jurisdiction, Yale's Ruth
Wedgwood urged that international courts, rather than being concerned
with individual crimes--whether committed during multi?national
or internal conflicts--should be reserved for massive, organized
crimes.
Ruth Wedgwood, in her presentation "Current Controversies
in the Law of War," pointed to several troubling issues.
Chief among these are the dangers involved when combatants disguise
themselves as civilians and thus endanger the civilian population,
the use of land mines, and the issue of who determines losses
in warfare. In her remarks, Professor Wedgwood argued that a soldier
disguised as a civilian should not be subject to summary execution
since this practice endangers true civilians caught up in searches
for guerrillas. Rather, we should treat captured guerrillas as
prisoners of war with all the rights attaching to this status.
Professor Wedgwood=s arguments about captured guerrillas received considerable attention from Yoram Dinstein in the discussion that followed. While maintaining that distinctions between combatants and civilians are necessary and that we should do everything possible to draw this line clearly, Dinstein argued that Third World nations do not care about conventions regarding this matter and that abuses will continue in these states, much to the consternation of the developed world. As to Professor Wedgwood's fear that land mines not removed after the end of a conflict will continue to kill and maim noncombatants and that we should therefore seek to limit their use, Dinstein again maintained that the Third World will not respect First World conventions on this matter. Agreeing with Wedgwood that mines should be either capable of self?destruction after a certain period or remain under the control of the forces laying them, Dinstein contended that Third World states are neither able to afford such sophisticated weaponry nor are they willing to give up weapons